A Hunting We Will Go

This weekend, in my midnight forays on Twitter (I do sleep, just not when you think I do), I discovered these graphs. As they say, a picture is worth a thousand words. These are worth far more because they visually represent high-level concepts on attackers and hunting. All credit goes to Jack Crook @jackr on Twitter, whose site is findingbad.blogspot.com.  We know how this game is played, that the attackers have been living in our networks far longer than we realized. Defence isn’t passive. It can’t be. We need to be actively monitoring all the things. We need to be expanding the Cyber Kill Chain past the perimeter and into the depths of our realm, to play this game of cat and mouse.

I’ve been pursuing my love of threat intel over these past months, and shared my learnings via talks at my local DC416 chapter, and then – fireworks and music – at Wall of Sheep at Defcon this year. OMG!  Reading Jack’s work just fires up my urge to learn more, and these depictions show what I want to say so very well.

“Enumeration”. Per Jack

Enumeration is an attacker need. They need to know where they are, where they can go, where’s the data they’re after.

“Credentials”. Jack says

Attackers need credentials if they’re going to move laterally within your network. Here’s some ideas to go digging for.

“Powershell”. Jack adds

Here are some additional things to think about when looking at Powershell

And I saved the best for last! How will they execute?

Process execution is an attacker need. There’s opportunities for developing creative ways to find when malicious.

Thank you, Jack, for sharing this wisdom. And thank you for reading!

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Live from Vegas! Hacker Summer Camp is this Week!

3 cons. 4 talks. No sleep. Lol. Well I did get some finally. It has been a whirlwind and I love it. Every glorious second!

BSidesLV has been the best yet. 3rd year for me. Volunteered as speaker liaison, which I love because I give talks. It’s about helping them feel more confident, ready to step up and own that moment. I also had the early bird shift in the lobby as greeter. Since I am a morning person, 6:00 a,m Vegas time was fine with me. Besides, you can’t beat watching the sun come up over the desert hills.

I was a mentor to a terrific speaker. BSides has the Proving Grounds track to encourage and enable folks to give talks. It’s how I got started, and I will forever be grateful.  And mentoring is mutually rewarding. I’ll do a separate post on it because I think it’s so vital.  My mentee, Karolyn Bachelor, gave a great talk on how to ask the right questions for the right answers. Way to go! I’ll post links.  And my other mentee from home, Nitha Suresh, gave her first talk at Proving Grounds as well. I am thrilled for both of them!

womenbsideslv

And I had fun again this year, giving my talk in the Underground Track, picking up where I left off last year on How to Rob a Bank. This year was “Banking on Insecurity”, because the hits just keep on coming. The room was packed and my opening line went something like “Holy sh*t!” lol! We had lots of interactions and laughs about some very serious and even controversial topics in the realm of finsec and cyber security. Honestly, it was better than I could have wished for!

Now, I have two full days ahead of the little con that could. The Diana Initiative is about encouraging, empowering and supporting women in InfoSec and Tech. It rose from the ashes of what was TiaraCon, of which we will say no more.  This event comes from the heart, and what I will say is that we were so moved by the belief in what we were doing by the attendees from last year. Failure was not an option. There were people counting on us to deliver and we have made it happen. Oh my god this community and their support is amazing. Truly. I am grateful beyond words for the generosity shown.  And as being part of this extraordinary team, who pulled together, gave up sleep, work, life to make this happen – I am so blessed. Resilience. Strength. Determination. We are gonna change some lives, make a difference and have a great time doing it. The Diana Initiative – this Con is on!

Petnya Post-Mortem: Wiper, not Ransom

This wasn’t just another ransomware attack. It marks a pivot. Because these are the games nationstates play. With collateral damage and no impunity because attribution is hard. We left brick and mortar behind some time ago, when the battlefield moved to cyberspace, where there are no boundaries. Moreover, whatever previous rules of battle we followed do not apply.

There was a one-two punch, with the events out of the Ukraine Thursday morning.  Absolutely things were connected and we need to remember that going forward. Bigger picture. Because a lot is at play right now. From my vantage point, as a Poli Sci grad, cyber security is intrinsically tied to whatever is going on in the larger arena. National security. Global security. The whims of the powers that be dictate their machinations of technology, which has become their new and shiny arsenal. They’ve been at it for a while now, but unlike conventional physical battlefields, we don’t witness what plays out until we’re impacted.

What’s critical to me is that this attack was presented as ransomware to throw us off. As described by The Grugq:

This is definitely not designed to make money. This is designed to spread fast and cause damage, with a plausibly deniable cover of “ransomware.”

This was actually a targeted attack against Ukraine, using malware that was highly destructive. This attack was never about making money. It was all about taking down systems and taking away access to essential service, as per this illustration from the blog post by The Grugq :

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Think CIA – confidentiality, integrity, accessibility. Ransomware and wiperware go after accessibility. And in our world, downtime can equal death, figuratively as well as literally (think hospitals and critical infrastructure).  As Leslie Carhart says:

Blood is in the Water -Not only have criminals found that ransomware is a great money-making scheme, but nation states and terrorist organizations have realized pseudo-ransomware makes a misleading and effective weapon. A weapon that can cause collateral damage, globally.

 

 

 

 

 

 

There have been some excellent reviews of what this attack was about, and how the Eternal Blue exploit released via ShadowBrokers was yet again leveraged against unpatched systems. Key takeaways were:

  • Unpatched systems will continue to be our undoing and exploited. We’re more at risk now because of that cache of exploits being lobbed at us monthly via the ShadowBrokers.
  • Lateral movement within networks works for attackers and infection spread. Segment. Segregate. Flat networks are an attacker’s dream.
  • Multiple infection vectors. There were as many as 4 ways for the target to be compromised.
  • Backup and test how those restore. Don’t assume anything. And keep backups off the main network
  • Windows.  Everyone uses it. Powershell. Sysinternals. AD. PSExec. Let’s keep learning about these because the attackers sure as heck know what they can do with them.

We know what er are not doing well. It’s catching up with us. Let me end with these words of wisdom by Leslie:

Defense in depth, including human threat hunting and effective detection and prevention at many points, is key. This will involve policy and financial buy-in from many lagging organizations at a new level.

And this sums it up:

 

 

 

 

 

 

These blog posts say everything I could ever want you to know, only better. Please read them:

The Grugq: Pnetya: Yet Another Ransomware Outbreak  .

Leslie Carhart @hacksforpancakes:  Why NotPetya Kep Me Awake (And You Should Worry Too)

Cisco Talos Blog: New Ransomware Variant Netnya Compromises Systems Worldwide

TiaraCon 2017 – Alliances!

 

YES! TiaraCon 2017 is a thing and  I will be part of this wonderful event again this year. July 27-28 in Vegas. We want to celebrate and encourage women and diversity in our field. We’ve heard moving stories about how attendees were inspired to go for their dreams, and to feel safe and accepted. This time we are at a new location, to be close to DefCon and where the action is: Caesar’s Palace Hotel.

Updates: Our first CFP was a tremendous success and all the acceptances have been issued. Now I must do the hardest part, which is send out the rejection letters. I’ll be crafting those carefully, because people really deserve to hear thank you.

Funding: It takes a lot to make change happen. Any amount helps us to make a difference. Visit our GoFundMe

Registration: Visit our site and sign up otherwise you won’t be able to get in. And you know you want that tiara 🙂

1 Billion Accounts Breached: Are YOU in here?

pwndedd

If you haven’t heard, there are currently about 1 billion accounts caught in two massive breaches: Exploit.in and AntiPublic. I’m one of that billion, and so was a family member. So are work colleagues. So that’s why I’m writing this – for the people I want to protect.

Security researcher Troy Hunt has been actively working on these breaches and getting notifications out. Among the key concerns raised was credential stuffing.

Credential stuffing is the automated injection of breached username/password pairs in order to fraudulently gain access to user accounts. This is a subset of the brute force attack category: large numbers of spilled credentials are automatically entered into websites until they are potentially matched to an existing account, which the attacker can then hijack for their own purposes.

As Troy lays out -and we need to be reminded of – this matters to us because:

  • It’s enormously effective due to the password reuse problem
  • It’s hard for organisations to defend against because a successful “attack” is someone logging on with legitimate credentials
  • It’s very easily automatable; you simply need software which will reproduce the logon process against a target website
  • There are readily available tools and credential lists that enable anyone to try their hand at credential stuffing

You can read his site to see more. So what that leads to is stuff like this:

Exploit.in is 111 text files large at 24 GB, a mountain of email addresses paired with passwords Given Troy’s research do far, of the 593,427,119 unique email addresses contained, there are accurate ie valid creds and data that isn’t already compromised so fresh kill. There are only 222 million duplicates between the lists, so that means 63% of the accounts in Exploit are different from the 457,962,538 addresses in AntiPublic.

The numbers are staggering, but what we need to be “impressed” by is what led to this. It’s the same root causes, known failings and weaknesses and bad habits that have accumulated as data has accumulated. We all know how much easier it is to fix a problem in the early stages.

So the AntiPublic tool verifies how legitimate hacked credentials are, and there are data breach services that pop up to buy and sell these credentials. I have contacts who tell me that everytime these dumps happen they find a significant number of compromises in their regions, regardless of how many recycled creds are in there. Troy gathered some explanations on how this works:

the tool itself is for sale here [redacted]
it’s pretty cheap
it’s mostly used in Russia, but he does sell an english version
most common use-case: someone buys a dump on x forum, uses the tool to verify which ones are legit
similar to sentryMBA and account hitman
you will often see a uniqueness score associated with the sale based on output

I really appreciate the work done by security researcher Troy Hunt and his site HaveIBeenPwned .  This is a quick and easy way for anyone to check the status of their email or username, as well as to receive notifications of when they may be caught up in a breach. Because the sooner you can change your passwords, the better.

 

It Really Was the Lazarus Group, in North Korea with SWIFT

swift

Last week, news broke that the US had linked North Korea to the theft of millions against the Federal Reserve in a series of bank heists involving the SWIFT messengering system.  I did a couple talks last year about banking insecurity as a fairy tale that misrepresented itself in the form of that trusted messengering system, SWIFT.  The deeper I delved, the scarier that fairy tale got. But from the start I had my suspicions about who was behind it and why. Why was a big factor because it ruled out the usual bank cyber crime suspects, aka Russia and Eastern Europe. This was too overt a move for a nation state to make right? Well, that depends which nation state you are.

And this was where my poli sci years kicked in.  I’ve always stood at that intersection of international relations and cybersecurity. It’s one heck of a vantage point. I do threat intel. Still pinching myself because I didn’t know this thing I love to do even existed a few years ago. But as I learn and grow in this field, what becomes increasingly clear is the need for context. That we have to take more than we surmise into account to really get the big picture. And we need the big picture to do this right. Otherwise we risk making the wrong call when we choose to play the attribution blame game, where the stakes are high and the consequences could level a lot more than the proverbial playing field.  So international relations, current affairs, global economy and history all need to be factored in. Then we have data with context and points that link, so we can see patterns.

kimbo

Linda Davidson/Washington Post

Because for me this story was always so much more than just “hackers went after a billion but only got 81 million”.  Who was behind those hackers? Why Bank of Bangladesh? Who needed a billion badly enough to digitally “rob” a bank? I’ll admit I have my likely crew: Russia, China, North Korea.  In this case, Russia and China were too big to make this kind of a play and have to contend with the global condemnation.  That’s a headache they would rather avoid and neither needed a billion dollars that badly. However, North Korea was a different story: impoverished, starving, and whose wildcard of a leader answered to no one in his quest for nukes. As per a recent story in the Washington Post:

“North Korea has consistently been treated like a joke, but now the joke has nuclear weapons,” said John Park, director of the Korea Working Group at the Harvard Kennedy School. “If you deem Kim Jong Un to be irrational, then you’re implicitly underestimating him.”

Kim Jong Un may be crazy but he’s crazy like a fox.  Hence why the attacks were on banks where nobody would care. Because the truth is first world problems get the attention, not developing nations like those in South East Asia. And of course, security was lax, because the resources just weren’t there. Nor was the mindset.  Corruption and coercion get things done in many parts of the world. How do you factor those into NIST spreadsheets and security audits?

A colleague and I had a great brainstorming session on geopolitics and cybersecurity as we put the details together. His keen insights and my paranoia spun the needle to land on North Korea. We just didn’t have any proof.  Fast forward a few months later, though, and tracks were found in the butter. Remember what I said earlier about the importance of history, context and patterns? Key pieces of code harkened back to the attack on Sony, and some very crafty work by the Lazarus Group.  While it wasn’t a smoking gun, it certainly was substantive. After his work on decoding Stuxnet, I listen when Eric Chien of Symantec weighs in. He knew what he saw there and he called it.

sonyhackIn the realm of cyber criminals, The Lazarus Group are somewhat nebulous, hard to pin down, and known for their ability to die off and then resurrect themselves, hence their name.  They’ve been identified as operating out of North Korea. To me, that means North Korea gives them a safe haven in return for services rendered. They are the bag man for their host supplying “dirty deeds”, just not done dirt cheap.  Because nation states don’t do this stuff for themselves when they need to remain one step removed.  Let me state that things are no where near this simplistic, and yes, China factors into this as well.  But no surprise there given the long-standing partnership between China and North Korea.

lazarus_map_ENWhere does this lead? Well, I did allude to the possibility of global economic chaos being used in the games nations play, because it’s all about the power and money is just a means to that end. Now we have news reports saying how nation states have resorted to robbing banks, and what a terrifying prospect that is. According to Richard Ledgett, Deputy Director of the NSA, in a story by the Wall Street Journal:

“If that linkage is true, that means a nation-state is robbing banks. That is a big deal; it’s different,” he said on Tuesday during a panel discussion at the Aspen Institute.

Mhm. I have a lot more where that came from.

Please click here if you’d like to see my talk on SWIFT and banking insecurities.

sectorslide

The ABC’s of APTs: Shamoon

sham35Welcome to the grey zone where politics and cyber meet. APTs or advanced persistent threats, are one of my favourite acronyms (but then you know how I am intrigued by Stuxnet and cartels), and essentially are how nation states get their digital digs at each other. Usually the intention is to get information, because knowledge is power. Cyberespionage can give a competing nation a real competitive advantage in the world economy, among other things. But sometimes, there is a need to control more, and that is where weaponizing code takes on a whole new nasty.

The keyword here is “persistence.”  First, attackers must find their way into the networks of the target. Usually, they employ targeted spear phishing, painstakingly staking out the right victim to receive that loaded email.  The investment of time and money at this point is essential, so as not to tip anyone off. And the emails are crafted so carefully, picking up on points tailored to that recipient so that they will open it, and launch the attachment that will create an entry point for the attacker. There is a reason why phishing is at the heart of so many breaches.

Now, imagine a video game, where you must progressively meet the challenges of each level to go higher. That is the attacker moving through the network, acquiring credentials to gain access to the crown jewels. The strategy is to find someone lower level, then work your way up. Hence, persistence, because this is an investment of both time and patience. Expect the key executives or decision makers to be well-guarded, with access and authorization controls in place. Not the case for someone lower on the food chain. All an attacker needs is to gain access. As proven repeatedly, once in, they can take all the time they need to find what they want. Case in point: the attack on the Ukraine power grid in December 2016.  The attackers were in that system for over nine months, collecting what they needed, notably credentials for the Virtual Private Network, that enabled them to jump the security gap onto the restricted side. As Stuxnet taught us, there is no such thing as air-gapped security.

shamoonattackgraphic

We know the Russians hacked the US; we know China hacked the US and Canada; and yes, the US has hacked someone too. These are the games nations play. The trick, of course, is not to get caught before you have the prize. And when you do get caught?  Well, as we’ve seen play out, nothing really bad happens. Just expect that your victim will be in your systems. Unless information isn’t the endgame and control is. Then, be prepared for something to go bump in the night.

Shamoon is devastating wiper malware that took out a massive swath of Saudi Aramco when it first debuted in 2012.  Linked to Iran, and an ongoing feud in the region between key players, it was a targeted attack against the oil giant, damaging or destroying 35,000 computers. Sec Def at the time, Leon Panetta, described it as “probably the most destructive cyber attack on a business.”

Wiper malware was used against business targets in  December 2014 destroying the systems in a Vegas casino, The Sands, after owner Sheldon Adelson advocated using nuclear weapons against Iran. The US “publicly cited Iran as the culprit”.   Then Disstrack was used again in December 2015, in the attack that brought Sony to its knees.  These aren’t gangs using cybercrime for monetary gain. These are the equivalent of acts of war, given the level of damage done.

Fast forward to late 2016. Two major attacks happened in Saudi: November 17 taking out systems at the airport and other Saudi government agencies, and then again on November 29. Then, on January 23 there was another attack. The malware used was almost identical to the original Shamoon, aka Disstrack.  Except there were a few key enhancements.  According to Andrew Plato, CEO of Anitian Enterprise Security

 “What is really worrisome about this is it’s just outright destructive. It isn’t really trying to steal anything. It’s the closest things we’re going to get to a cyber bomb”.

The new version, dubbed Shamoon 2, spread through the local network using legitimate counts belonging to users and administrators, with complex passwords likely obtained from an earlier attack. Remember what I said about persistence?  This new version, however went on to attack VDIs, or Virtual Desktops, which previously could have offered some protection because of their ability to load snapshots of systems that were wiped. Now Shamoon had migrated from just Windows-based systems to Linux in the attacks on VDIs.

cyberwar1-1024x482

Now, I don’t want to be alarmist and spread FUD everywhere. Yes, this is serious and destructive. Like Stuxnet, it broke things. And that’s the differentiator. So far, the line hasn’t been crossed where breaking things was deliberately done to harm people. Because as Archer would say: You want cyberwar? Because that’s how you get cyberwar.

While the expectation is that Iran is once again behind the attacks, Symantec has revealed there are multiple parties involved. More than one entity, so collaboration and cooperation.  The report is that an entity known as Greenbug may have assisted in getting the credentials needed for access.  Palo Alto reported on a campaign known as Magic Hound which targeted energy, technology and government with ties or locations in Saudi.  There were links between Magic Hound and two other actors with Iranian ties: Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten. Finally, putting all this together was the group Timberworm or Cobalt Gypsy.  Per Symantec, Timberworm was behind the January 23 attacks.

Here’s the play by play. First, Timberworm used spear phishing emails with weaponized documents (we warned you about those Office Macros!) to gain initial access into the network. Once there, they used custom malware, along with leveraging existing sysadmin tools to avoid detection, and help them achieve persistent remote access. Quick FYI: custom malware is a hallmark of major organized cybercrime groups or nation state attacks because it costs a lot of time and money to craft, and the stakes are going to be very high.

Apparently Greenbug and Timberworm have been active, penetrating organizations beyond Saudi. Note that Shamoon, however, was only used against the Saudi target. Timberworm is a large operation, as is Greenbug, with targets in a range of areas. We know who they are now, what they can do, and that they have a shared interest. What we don’t know: the endgame. I’m waiting for that other shoe to drop.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-01/another-false-flag-destructive-iranian-hackers-allegedly-wreak-havoc-saudi-computer-

http://www.securityweek.com/shamoon-2-variant-targets-virtualization-products

http://www.securityweek.com/multiple-groups-cooperated-shamoon-attacks-Symantec

http://www.archersecuritygroup.com/second-wave-bomb-malware-hits-saudi-arabia/